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The Labor Dimension of the Emerging Free Trade Area of the Americas
Steve Charnovitz*
Introduction
Negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) began over six years ago and are
slated to be finished by 2005.1 The nations of the Americas could certainly benefit from freer trade,
as Latin America is afflicted with widespread poverty, high unemployment, and the most unequal
income distribution in the world.2 So far, no formal talks on labor have been held. That could
change as the FTAA nears completion in 2004 or thereafter.
The purpose of these lectures is to explore a labor dimension for the FTAA. This study is
divided into four parts: Part 1 provides context by reviewing the history of Inter-American economic
cooperation, especially on labor and trade. Part 2 examines how labor has been addressed in the
major free trade agreements of the Americas. Part 3 looks at the normative basis for international
labor cooperation. Part 4 makes specific recommendations for addressing labor issues in the FTAA.
1. Historical Context
The significance of labor as an FTAA issue cannot be understood by looking only at the
FTAA negotiations that commenced in April 1998. Although the official FTAA website traces the
FTAA’s ‘antecedents’ as far back as the 1st Summit of the Americas held in December 19943, the
story actually begins 170 years earlier — when Simon Bolívar inspired the first assembly of the

*George Washington University Law School, June 2004. This is the draft version of the paper that
will appear in Philip Alston, ed., Labour Rights as Human Rights (Oxford, 2005).
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See generally José M. Salazar-Xirinaches and Maryse Robert (eds), Toward Free Trade in the
Americas (Brookings, 2001). The negotiations include all countries in the Americas except Cuba.
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Report of the ILO Director-General, Globalization and Decent Work in the Americas, 15th American
Regional Meeting, December 2002, at 10–13.
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Http://www.ftaa-alca.org/View_e.asp.
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American Republics. This 1824 Congress of Panama, as it became known, was convened to consider
an agenda of political, collective security, and commercial issues. The Congress produced a Treaty
of Perpetual Union, League, and Confederation which, although postponing the topic of commercial
relations until the next assembly, dealt with a number of controversial issues, such as the abolition of
the African slave trade.4 This Treaty did not go into force, however, and no follow-up assembly was
held. Hemispheric cooperation puttered along over the next several decades in seeming perpetual
discord.
The Western Hemisphere resurged in 1889 when the United States took the lead in convening
and hosting the International American Conference.5 The promotion of regional trade and dispute
settlement were among the top goals for that endeavor. The Conference concluded that while free
trade among the nations of the hemisphere was a premature idea, interested governments might seek
partial reciprocity treaties with one or more countries as it may be in their interest to do.6
This First7 Pan American Conference sparked new treaties and institutions that, in fits and
starts, propelled continental economic and social cooperation over several decades. The International
Bureau of American Republics was established in 1890 and became the Pan American Union in
1910. In 1948, the Pan American Union was transformed into the Organization of American States
4

Peter Blanchard, ‘Pan Americanism and Slavery in the Era of Latin American Independence,’ in
David Sheinin (ed), Beyond the Ideal. Pan Americanism in Inter-American Affairs, (Praeger, 2000),
9, at 9–18; Josef F. Kunz, ‘The Idea of “Collective Security” in Pan-American Developments,’ 6
Western Political Quarterly 658 (1953); Joseph Byrne Lockey, Pan-Americanism. Its Beginnings
(MacMillan, 1920), at 312–345. The proposals to liberalize trade were blocked by Mexico. Samuel
Guy Inman, Inter-American Conference 1826–1954: History and Problems (University Press and
Community College Press, 1965), at 9.
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Javier Corrales and Richard E. Feinberg, ‘Regimes of Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere:
Power, Interests, and Intellectual Traditions,’ 43 International Studies Quarterly 1, at 5 (1999).
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The International Conferences of American States 1889–1928 (Carnegie Endowment, 1931), at 33–
34.
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In deference to tradition, I spell out the ordinal numbers denominating the early Pan American
conferences. This will also distinguish them from the nomenclature of the recent conferences.
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(OAS), which, together with the Rio Treaty for collective security, solidified the foundation for the
Inter-American human rights system and many other fields of regional cooperation.
The Summit of the Americas of 1994 was not the first hemispheric summit, but it almost
seems that way because it revitalized regional cooperation to promote democratic values and
economic prosperity.8 Today, the Inter-American system operates through a vibrant triad of: (1)
formal institutions (the main ones being the OAS and the Inter-American Development Bank), (2)
periodic transgovernmental Summits and conferences, and (3) partnerships with business and civil
society organizations.
State participation in the system has been nearly universal with a few notable exceptions:
Canada did not join the OAS until 1990. Cuba was made unwelcome at the OAS after 1962, a fate
that did not befall other countries that suffered periods of dictatorship. The English-speaking
Caribbean countries began entering the OAS in the 1960s.
The remainder of Part 1 will discuss the course of labor cooperation in the Americas during
the past century. No comprehensive study of this topic has come to my attention, and my goal here is
merely to highlight some of the key milestones. Some commentators may dismiss this history as
being inconsequential because of the seeming lack of governmental follow-up. A sound judgment
needs to await new scholarship using both institutionalist and constructivist lenses.
Labor and social issues surfaced only occasionally in the early conferences. At the Second
Pan American (Mexico City) Conference of 1901–1902, the governments formulated a Convention
on the Practice of Learned Professions designed to make it easier for professionals in one country to
practice in another.9 The Fifth Pan American (Santiago) Conference of 1923 called on governments
to promote vocational training through the exchange of teachers and workmen. The Conference
8

See Robin L. Rosenberg, ‘The OAS and the Summit of the Americas: Coexistence, or Integration of
Forces for Multilateralism?,’ 43 Latin American Politics and Society 79 (2001).
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Convention on the Practice of Learned Professions, 27 January 1902, 6 Martens (3d) 191.
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further agreed that international questions relating to social problems should be included on the
program of all future conferences.10
Alongside the hemispheric cooperation, there were also other efforts. For example, in 1923, a
Conference of Central American Affairs approved a General Treaty of Peace and Amity, as well as
some specialized treaties, including a Convention for the Establishment of Free Trade and a
Convention on the Unification of Protective Laws for Workmen and Labourers.11 The Unification
Convention of 1923 was notably progressive — particularly with regard to prohibiting involuntary
labor and providing for compulsory insurance — because similar norms were not achieved in the
International Labour Organization (ILO) until years later.
The Pan American system was also remarkable for devoting attention to discrete social
matters. The First American Child-Welfare Congress convened in 1916 with organizational
assistance from the League of Women’s and Child’s Right.12 Earlier child welfare and nutrition
congresses had been held in Europe, and, as with much of the functional international networking of
that era, the initiative and energy came from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working closely
with technical experts and government officials. In 1927, the Fifth Pan American Child Congress
established an International American Institute for the Protection of Childhood, which continues to
operate today as the Inter-American Children’s Institute, a specialized organ of the OAS.
Although there is some overlap between children’s rights and labor rights, the two fields are
distinguishable. The Pan American cooperation on children is noted here because it has been more
active than the labor cooperation. One reason might be is that although the multilateral ILO existed
for labor issues, children’s issues lacked global institutions and therefore bloomed better at the
10

The International Conferences of American States, supra note 6, at 260–266.
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Manley O. Hudson (ed), International Legislation, Vol. II, at 901 et seq.
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Seventh International Conference of American States, ‘Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Committees’
(1933), at 59–60.

5

regional level. The same point can be made about the Inter-American Commission on Women,
founded in 1928, which preceded and inspired later developments at the global level.13
The Sixth Pan American (Havana) Conference of 1928 approved a resolution on Emigration
and Immigration which called for the principle of equality of civil rights as between nationals and
foreigners.14 The entire immigration issue proved controversial, however, as states jealously guarded
their autonomy. For example, the United States insisted that ‘the control of immigration is a matter
of purely domestic concern....’15 Yet some states saw a common interest in more open borders. For
instance, El Salvador proposed no state not place obstacles to emigration and immigration among
American states.
In 1933, the Seventh Pan American (Montevideo) Conference approved several labor-related
resolutions. For example, the Conference called on governments to facilitate freedom of association,
to adopt the principle of ‘family income’ in order to increase ‘human capital,’ and to establish a
register of immigration possibilities in each country.16 Another resolution called for a ‘Campaign
Against Unemployment,’ including measures to facilitate local, national, and international commerce.
The Conference also sought the establishment of an Inter-American Labor Institute with a mandate to
develop recommendations and principles for the solution of American social problems which were
thought to have features ‘distinctive from, if not in conflict with European problems’ being dealt with
by the ILO.17 Among the valuable principles slated for discussion was ‘that the machine must be

13

Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, and Lung-chu Chen, Human Rights and World Public
Order (Yale 1980), at 644–645.
14

The International Conferences of American States, supra note 6, at 378–381.
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Id. at 380.
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The International Conferences of American States. First Supplement 1933–1940 (Carnegie
Endowment, 1940), at 92–93, 238–240, 270.

17

The International Conferences, First Supplement, supra note 16, at 39–41.
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considered as a helper of man and not as his substitute.’ For various reasons, the hopes to establish
the Institute proved unsuccessful.
Attention to labor issues continued during World War II. In 1942, a Meeting of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs of the American Republics made a series of recommendations, one of which was that
international agreements or long term contracts should provide ‘a fair standard of wages for the
workers of the Americas, in which producers are protected against competition from products
originating in areas wherein real wages are unduly low....’18 The Ministers also asked for input
regarding postwar problems from the Inter-American Juridical Committee. In response, the Juridical
Committee put forward several recommendations, including the need to ‘guarantee to each individual
a degree of economic security ... necessary to enable him to develop his personality....’19 With regard
to its social recommendations, the Committee observed that the ‘realization of these objectives is
primarily the task of each separate State, but only by parallel international action can they be
adequately secured.’20
In early 1945, the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace (known as the
Mexico City or Chapultepec Conference) approved an ‘Economic Charter of the Americas’
containing 10 guiding principles. The first principle was for governments to direct economic policies
toward the creation of conditions which will encourage, through expanding
domestic and foreign trade and investment, the attainment everywhere of high
levels of real income, employment and consumption, free from excessive
fluctuations, in order that their peoples may be adequately fed, housed, and

18

Final Act of the Third Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, January
1942, 36 AJIL Supp. 61, at 64 (1942).

19

‘Preliminary Recommendations on Postwar Problems,’ International Conciliation, No. 387,
February 1943, 101, at 125.

20

Id.
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clothed, have access to services necessary for health, education, and well-being,
and enjoy the rewards of their labor in dignity and in freedom.21
The Conference also approved a ‘Declaration of the Social Principles of America’ which called on
every country in the region to adopt social legislation on a scale not lower than that indicated in ILO
conventions, including the recognition of the right of workers to organize, bargain collectively, and to
strike.22 This Declaration was premised on the axiom that ‘man must be the center of interest of all
efforts of peoples and governments,’ a thought that returned like a comet 50 years later at the United
Nations (UN) Copenhagen Summit.23 The extensive language on worker rights negotiated at Mexico
City is astonishing, and may be explainable in part by the fact that some of the national delegations
contained nongovernmental advisors from labor, social, and educational movements.24 This inclusive
form of participation was not used in subsequent conferences, and is not a feature of the current
FTAA negotiations.25
Latin American attention to the problem of unfair labor competition was brought forward into
the UN Conference on Trade and Employment. This Conference drafted the Charter of the
International Trade Organization (ITO), but it did not go into force. As one of the drafters has
21

Final Act of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace (Pan American Union,
1945), Res. LI, 92, at 94–96. This was a conference of wartime allies that excluded Argentina
because of its neutrality.

22

Final Act, supra note 21, Res. LVIII, 102, at 104–105. This was three years before the adoption of
the ILO Convention on Freedom of Association and the Right to Organise (No. 87).
23

Compare: ‘To this end, we will create a framework for action to: (a) Place people at the centre of
development and direct our economies to meet human needs more effectively;...’ World Summit for
Social Development, Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development, 12 March 1995, UN Doc.
A/CONF.166/9, para. 26(a).

24

Inman, supra note 4, at 212. The nongovernmental advisors also sought to influence the
negotiations on trade. For example, the U.S. government’s proposal for reciprocal tariff reductions
was opposed by the Mexican trade unions who argued that the United States had relied upon tariffs to
protect domestic industries during its own industrial development. Id. at 215.
25

Several years ago, Brazil sought a role for labor representatives in national delegations to the FTAA
talks, but gave up after opposition by the Clinton Administration and other governments. Kevin G.
Hall, ‘Brazil Drops Demand for Labor at Trade Talks,’ Journal of Commerce, 15 May 1997, 5A.
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chronicled, there was a demand from a number of Latin American countries that each government
should be relieved of trade obligations toward countries having lower labor conditions.26 Although
this effort to adopt a labor escape clause failed, the ensuing ITO Charter did include a provision on
fair labor standards.27
Labor has always been an OAS issue. The OAS Charter was drafted in 1948 at the Ninth Pan
American (Bogotá) Conference.28 The original OAS Charter contained two articles on Social
Standards, one of which sought ‘respect for freedom of association and for the dignity of the
worker.’29 The current Charter contains more elaborate provisions regarding labor.30 For example,
the governments have agreed to make the greatest possible efforts to harmonize social legislation of
the developing countries, so that the rights of workers will be equally protected, and in order to
facilitate the process of Latin American and Caribbean integration. In addition, the OAS spearheaded
the American Convention on Human Rights of 1969, which features several labor rights provisions.31

26

Clair Wilcox, A Charter for World Trade (MacMillan, 1949), at 139.

27

Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, March 1948, Art. 7, available at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net. Susan Ariel Aaronson, Taking Trade to the Streets. The Lost History
of Public Efforts to Shape Globalization (University of Michigan Press, 2001), at 52–53; Elissa
Alben, ‘GATT and the Fair Wage: A Historical Perspective on the Labor-Trade Link,’ 101 Columbia
Law Review 1410, at 1427–1441 (2001) (reviewing the negotiations and efforts to implement them).

28

This Conference also approved the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man that
contains several provisions on labor and employment. See
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/zoas2dec.htm. Among its provisions is the statement that ‘It
is the duty of every person to work, as far as his capacity and possibilities permit, in order to obtain
the means of livelihood or to benefit his community.’ Id. Art. XXXVII.

29

Charter of the OAS, 30 April 1948, 119 UNTS 3, Arts. 28, 29.

30

Charter of the OAS, available at http://www.oas.org, Arts. 34(g), 45, 46.

31

See American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/basic2.htm, Arts. XIV, XVI, XXII. Robert F. Drinan, The
Mobilization of Shame (Yale, 2001), at 112–117 (discussing the Inter-American human rights
regime).

9

The OAS has been very active in the period from 1994 onward. One key landmark was the
adoption, on September 11, 2001, of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. Declaring that ‘the
peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy,’ the Charter contains numerous important
commitments and statements, including that the strengthening of democracy ‘requires the full and
effective exercise of workers’ rights and the application of core labor standards’ recognized in the
ILO.32
So far, my study has examined the labor facets of Inter-American political relations, but two
other ongoing streams of regional labor cooperation should be considered. One has been carried out
under the auspices of the ILO. The other operates within the framework of the Inter-American
system.
One interesting footnote of ILO history is that the opening session of its inaugural 1919
conference was held in the ornate Hall of the Americas at the Pan American Union building in
Washington, D.C. The Executive Officer of the Union welcomed the ILO, and expressed hope that
the 30 years of Pan American cooperation would inspire the ILO.33 At the 1919 Conference, there
were delegations from 16 Latin American countries.34
Since 1936, there have been 15 Labour Conferences of the American States. Like all ILO
activities, these were tripartite conferences with national participation by governments, workers, and
employers. While many of the resolutions adopted were trained on industrial relations, some also
covered international trade policy. For example, in 1939, a resolution on Economic and Financial

32

Inter-American Democratic Charter, available at http://www.oas.org/charter/docs, Arts. 1, 10. The
first initiative to promote democracy in Latin America may have been the effort of Pedro Felix
Vicuña in 1837. Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Reconceptualizing Sovereignty in the Americas: Historical
Precursors and Current Practices,’ 19 Houston Journal of International Law 705, at 713 (1997).

33

League of Nations, International Labor Conference, First Annual Meeting (GPO, 1920), at 11–12.

34

Jef Rens, ‘Latin America and the International Labour Organisation,’ 80 International Labour
Review 1, at 2 (1959).
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Cooperation observed that ‘an increase in international trade activity is calculated to promote an
improvement in standards of life...,’ and also recommended that ‘credit arrangements concluded
between nations of the American continent should make provision for the effective enforcement of
fair labour standards upon all work financed in virtue of such agreements.’35 The 1946 Conference
approved a resolution on Vocational Training that went well beyond the existing ILO
recommendation in addressing the need for ‘training and retraining of adult workers.’36 The 1949
Conference approved a resolution on the Social Aspects of Economic Development that called for
measures to promote the expansion of markets by the development of international trade, and urged
the ILO to cooperate with the Economic Commission for Latin America and the International Trade
Organization.37 The resolution further stated that technical assistance directed to the social aspects of
economic development should form an integral part of any program of technical assistance furnished
through international organizations. In a survey of the first 40 years of ILO work in Latin America,
Jef Rens concluded that ILO conventions and technical assistance had an important influence on
national law.38

35

Second Labour Conference of the American States which are Members of the International Labour
Organisation (ILO, 1941), Res. XII, 262, at 263.
36

Third Labour Conference of the American States which are Members of the International Labour
Organisation (ILO, 1946), Res. 1, 270, at 274. Compare to the ILO Vocation Training
Recommendation (No. 57), 1939.

37

Fourth Labour Conference of American States Members of the International Labour Organisation
(ILO, 1951), Res. 7, 263, at 268.
38

Rens, supra note 34. He quotes a Colombian government official as saying in 1933 that legislative
provisions for the protection of workers’ rights in Latin America ‘is due exclusively to Geneva’. Id.
at 19.
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The second stream of labor cooperation is transgovernmental.39 In 1963, the labor ministers
in the Americas began to hold conferences of their own as an outgrowth of the Alliance for Progress.
The 1963 Conference agreed on several principles, including that financial aid and trade policy
should be integrated, and that measures be taken to stabilize Latin America’s foreign exchange
earnings. Another principle enunciated was that there can be no effective economic and social
development planning unless the legitimate rights of labor are recognized.40 At the Fourth Conference
in 1972, the labor ministers called attention to the ‘gravity of the social problems affecting American
countries and the urgency of social development that goes beyond the criteria of the economists.’41
The Conferences over the next 20 years left little record.
Labor cooperation was reinvigorated by the 1st Summit of the Americas in 1994 and by the
initiation of the FTAA process. These two developments breathed new relevance into the
conferences of the Ministers of Labor by giving them an additional mission — to provide a channel
for labor concerns outside of trade negotiations. The 10th Labor Conference, held in 1995, set up a
working group to prepare a submission to the Ministers of Trade.42 This declaration was presented to
the 3rd FTAA ministerial in 1997. One of the suggestions made was that the FTAA should introduce
‘a social dimension that guarantees, as a minimum, respect for basic labor standards....’43 In 1998, the
2nd Summit of the Americas adopted a Plan of Action stating that the governments would exchange
39

The cooperation on labor is not formally part of the OAS. Similarly, the FTAA negotiations do not
belong to the OAS. Based on interviews with OAS officials Eduardo Mendoza and José Manuel
Salazar.

40

Inter-American Conference of Ministers of Labor on the Alliance for Progress (OAS, 1963), at 48–
49.

41

Fourth Conference, Final Act, OAS Doc. Ser.C/VI.16.4, November 1972, para. 5.

42

The labor minister conferences benefit from two advisory committees, from trade unions and from
business.

43

Declaration of the Tenth Inter-American Conference of Ministers of Labor Presented at the Meeting
of Ministers of Trade, Belo Horizonte, Brazil, May 1997, available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/FTAA/Belo/Minis/Cotpal_e.asp.
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informational materials regarding their labor legislation and further secure the observance and
promotion of internationally recognized core labor standards.44 Shortly thereafter, the governments
held the 11th Labour Conference which stated that the policies that form the basis of economic
growth, including free international trade, should be designed in a way that produces more jobs
consistent with internationally-recognized core labor standards.45 In 2001, the 3rd Summit of the
Americas adopted a Plan of Action with broad but general language on ‘Labor and Employment.’
Shortly thereafter, the 12th Labour Conference established two working groups — one on the Labour
Dimensions of the Summit of the Americas Process and the other on Building Capacity of Labour
Ministries.46 The 13th Labor Conference of 2003 adopted the Salvador Declaration which emphasizes
the importance of considering the social and labor components of hemispheric integration during all
stages of the FTAA negotiations process.47
Notwithstanding the repeated efforts of the labor ministers to signal that labor concerns
should be addressed in FTAA talks, the most recent declaration adopted by the FTAA trade ministers
(in November 2003) omits any labor dimension for the negotiations.48 So far, no government has
made a substantive labor proposal for the FTAA.

44

Second Summit of the Americas, Plan of Action, April 1998. This and other Summit documents
not specifically referenced here are available at http://www.summit-americas.org.

45

Declaration of Viña del Mar, 21 October 1998, OAS Trabadjo/doc.5/98 Rev. 2, para. 4.

46

Declaration and Plan of Action of Ottawa, 2001, available at
http://www.oas.org/udse/ingles2004/frameset.html.

47

13th Inter-American Conference of Ministers of Labor, Salvador Declaration, 26 September 2003,
para. 22, available at http://www.summit-americas.org/Quebec-Labor/labor-eng.htm.
48 th

8 FTAA Ministerial Declaration, November 2003, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org. This
Declaration expresses appreciation to the labor ministers for their input. An earlier FTAA ministerial
declaration had stated that most ministers recognize that the issues of environment and labor should
not be utilized as conditionalities nor be subject to disciplines. 6th FTAA Ministerial Declaration,
April 2001, Annex I, para. 1, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/Ministerials/BA/BA_e.asp.
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In summary, this historical glance back provides context for thinking about the labor and trade
connection in the Western Hemisphere. Achieving an FTAA would be the fruition of efforts for trade
integration that began in the early 19th century. Inter-American attention to employment and labor
extends back to the early 20th century, and the principle that there are common labor norms is well
embedded. The idea that core labor standards should undergird trade liberalization has been part of
trade discourse in the Americas since the 1940s. Nevertheless, consideration of labor as part of the
FTAA negotiation has been resisted by nearly all countries, which have instead preferred to address
labor via a network of labor ministries.49 The inclusion of labor within an FTAA would be a dead
letter were it not for the fact that gaining provisions on labor is one of the statutory trade negotiation
objectives of the United States.50
2. How Free Trade Agreements Address Labor
Any forthcoming labor dimension to the FTAA will be influenced by the existing law and
practice of free trade agreements in the region. Part 2 will provide an overview of that varied
experience. Some treaties, such as the recent Free Trade Agreement between Chile and South Korea,
completely omit labor.51 Yet many trade agreements do include labor, and this practice began with
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which was accompanied by a side agreement
on labor. The three parties in NAFTA are Canada, Mexico, and the United States.
The experience so far is summarized in Table 1, ‘Comparison of Key Labor Features of
Selected Inter-American Free Trade Agreements.’ The agreements are listed chronologically from
49

José Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs and Jorge Mario Martínez-Piva, ‘Trade, Labour Standards and
Global Governance: A Perspective from the Americas,’ in Stefan Griller (ed), International
Economic Governance and Non-Economic Concerns (Springer Verlag Wien, 2003), 315, at 336, 354.

50

19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(11). See Robert B. Zoellick, ‘When Trade Leads to Tolerance,’ New York
Times, 12 June 2004, A13 (‘The United States is the only nation pressing to include enforceable labor
and environmental protections in its trade agreements.’).

51

Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Chile, 15 February2003,
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/Chi-SKorea_e.
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left to right. One conclusion that can be drawn from Table 1 is that there is no optimal treatment of
labor in the sense of an agreement that is more progressive than the others in every way. The purely
American agreements do more on transparency and access to courts, while the agreement with the
European Community is more attentive to public participation and discourse. The only agreement to
create an international commission to promote cooperation is the North American Agreement on
Labor Cooperation (NAALC) in 1993. The other agreements promote cooperation through meetings
of national officials.
As Table 1 shows, none of the provisions on labor is subject to adjudication except for the
obligation that governments avoid a trade-related persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce
national labor law. The obligation to enforce national labor law is supervised through state-to-state
dispute settlement rather than by giving victims a right of action. If a complaining government
lodges a dispute and wins, the scofflaw government would be expected to improve its national
enforcement and if it does not, a monetary assessment can be imposed. Two of the agreements
provide for a trade sanction — a withdrawal of trade agreement benefits — to promote compliance.
A requirement to enforce national law is a puzzling objective in an international agreement.
The traditional approach in conventional international law is to promote a convergence and uplifting
of national law. Certainly, that is the stance taken by the ILO since 1919.52
The idea of using an international agreement to supervise the enforcement of national labor
law began with the NAFTA side agreement in 1993. This agreement was orchestrated by the Clinton
Administration which often pursued minimalist approaches to policy challenges. The proposition that
Country A has an interest in whether Country B enforces its national labor law, irrespective of the
content of Country B’s labor law, is hardly self-evident. Certainly, one can imagine situations where
52

Nicolas Valticos, ‘Droits de l’Homme et Droits du Travail sur le Plan International,’ in Droits
Syndical et Droits de l’homme à l’aube du XXIe Siecle: Mélanges en l’honneur de Jean-Maurice
Verdier (Dalloz, 2001), at 473. See also ILO Convention Concerning Night Work in Bakeries (No.
20), 8 June 1925, Art . 5 (calling on parties to ensure that its prohibition ‘is effectively enforced’).
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B’s law would be so repugnant to A that A might not want B to enforce it. B’s law might also be
inefficiently rigid, and so B may have a good reason not to enforce it. Many governments allow
outdated laws to remain on the books.
Nevertheless, one should not controvert the possibility of constructive results from a process
of reciprocal review of national enforcement. The actual results of the process need to be examined.
No empirical study has come to my attention of changes in the quality of labor law enforcement in
North America over the past 10 years. But data are available about the implementation of the side
agreement.53
The NAFTA labor side agreement has been in effect since January 1994, and in over ten
years, no government has brought a case against another government’s lack of enforcement of the
covered labor laws. Many informed observers have concluded that the NAFTA parties all live in
53

No consensus exists about the value of the NAFTA labor agreement. Many analysts have
commended it: See Frederick M. Abbott, ‘The North American Integration Regime and its
Implications for the World Trading System,’ J.H.H. Weiler (ed), The EU, The WTO and the NAFTA.
Towards a Common Law of International Trade (Oxford, 2001), 169, at 196–197; Ronald G.
Ehrenberg, Labor Markets and Integrating National Economies (Brookings, 1994), at 98–99;
William B. Gould IV, ‘Labor Law for a Global Economy: The Uneasy Case for International Labor
Standards,’ in Robert J. Flanagan and William B. Gould IV (eds), International Labor Standards
(Stanford University Press, 2003), 81, at 104–105; Marley S. Weiss, ‘Two Steps Forward, One Step
Back – Or Vice Versa: Labor Rights under Free Trade Agreements from NAFTA, Through Jordan,
via Chile to Latin America, and Beyond,’ 37 University of San Francisco Law Review 689, at 700–
707 (2003) (discussing the NAFTA ‘innovation’ of transposing domestic law into a trilateral
agreement).
Others analysts have criticized the agreement: See ‘Labor Agreement Process Criticized for Failure
to Protect Workers’ Rights,’ BNA Daily Report for Executives, 2 April 2004, A–10; William
Dymond, ‘Core Labour Standards and the World Trade Organization: Labour’s Love Lost,’ 8
Canadian Foreign Policy, Spring 2001, 99, at 102; Pharis J. Harvey & Bama Athreya, ‘Developing
Effective Mechanisms for Implementing Labor Rights in the Global Economy,’ Workers in the
Global Economy (Cornell University School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 2001), 1, at 13–16;
Laura Okin Pomeroy, ‘The Labor Side Agreement under the NAFTA: Analysis of its Failure to
Include Strong Enforcement Provisions and Recommendations for Future Labor Agreements
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glass houses with regard to labor rights, and so would be uninterested in throwing stones at the
others. For that reason, the three governments are also uninterested in amending the side agreement to
allow individuals to lodge complaints to an international tribunal.
The side agreement does allow individuals to send communications about national
enforcement problems, and 28 have been sent.54 Little has happened as a result, however, except for
some joint statements and remedial seminars. Of course, the fact that the enforcement provisions
have proved a nullity does not mean that the side agreement is unsuccessful. Overall, the experiment
has proved useful in creating an international commission to promote North American labor
cooperation.
Unfortunately, that institutional centerpiece was omitted from the U.S.–Chile Free Trade
Agreement. All that free trade agreement (FTA) does is to copy the problematic enforcement
provisions from the NAFTA side agreement. At the time of the NAFTA negotiation, the ILO
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work did not yet exist.55 The U.S.–Chile FTA
takes note of the Declaration, but does not mandate that governments follow it.56
The unratified U.S.–Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) adopts the same
approach of supervising the enforcement of national law.57 Kimberly Elliott calls this the ‘enforceyour-own-laws’ standard, and worries that it could discourage improvements in labor law if a
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government feels unable to enforce even its existing laws.58 Senator John F. Kerry has pledged to
revise the CAFTA’s labor chapter if elected President.59 Unlike NAFTA, CAFTA does not set up a
labor commission.
The absence of aspirations for labor law harmonization in Inter-American FTAs can be
contrasted with the pro-active approach taken with other economic objectives. This disparity is
demonstrated by Table 2, a synoptic ‘Comparison of Major Features of the North American Free
Trade Agreement and Side Agreements.’ NAFTA’s provisions on market access, investment, and
intellectual property commit the governments to follow NAFTA norms as prescribed or as
incorporated by reference from other international treaties. For example, the commitment for
intellectual property is not merely to enforce each country’s own national law. Instead, the
governments seek much deeper harmonization, by obliging each government to give rights to private
parties in specified forms of intellectual property. By contrast, for labor and the environment, the
NAFTA regime seeks only to reinforce the existing national law rather than to improve it.60
Referring to this double standard in U.S. trade agreements, Kimberly Elliott and Richard Freeman
observe that ‘If capital needs international protection from potentially corrupt and rapacious
government officials, surely so does labor.’61 The rationale for treating labor (and environment)
differently from the other harmonization is not explained within the NAFTA side agreements or in
58
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newer FTAs with that same orientation, such as the U.S.–Chile FTA. Perhaps revealing the
insufficiency of the stated labor objectives of recent FTAs, U.S. Trade Representative Robert B.
Zoellick has sought public credit for coaxing other countries to raise their laws during the trade
negotiations.62
The absence of any labor litigation under the NAFTA side agreement does not result from a
lack of litigiousness among NAFTA’s stakeholders. On the contrary, since the time that NAFTA
went into force in 1994, there have been five commercial complaints brought by governments, 94
commercial complaints brought by private parties, and 35 investment complaints brought by private
parties.63 Thus, a reasonable hypothesis might be that if the NAFTA labor agreement contained a
meaningful discipline and a private right of action, numerous cases would have been filed.
NAFTA is not the only Inter-American trade agreement with a labor dimension.64 The
Common Market of the South (Mercosur) also has given attention to social problems. The activities
in Mercosur feature tripartite consultation and the collection and analysis of data. In the Andean
Community, there are regular meetings of the ministers of labor.
The overall topic addressed by this study is whether the FTAA should contain rules on labor
and, if so, what they ought to be. No optimal architecture exists for FTAs. Rather, the right design
depends on what policymakers seek to achieve. Unless governments are willing to provide a private
62
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right of action to an international tribunal, however, no labor policy purpose is served by the current
FTA approach of committing governments to enforce their own idiosyncratic labor laws. The only
purpose being served by these labor provisions is to satisfy the political need of appearing to use the
FTA to safeguard worker rights.
That an international commitment to enforce one’s own domestic law makes little sense does
not necessarily justify the alternative approach of including within an FTA an obligation to follow
international labor standards. On the contrary, it would seem that if Countries A, B, C, etc. have an
interest in upwardly harmonizing their labor policies, that goal might be better accomplished through
a labor rather than a trade agreement. As Table 1 shows, some of the earlier Inter-American FTAs
took the approach of having a separate labor agreement, but that configuration has now been
abandoned (at least by the United States) in an effort to give trade agreements a holistic veneer.
What seems to be driving the current U.S. effort to incorporate labor provisions into FTAs is not to
achieve benefits of labor cooperation, but rather to show that trade concessions will be withdrawable
should the labor commitment be violated. That logic relates to political coalition building more than
to economic coherence. Part 3 of this study will discuss the economic coherence of sole labor and
trade-related labor cooperation, as well as the political foundations for intergovernmental labor
cooperation.
Before moving to Part 3, this lecture will address one other matter, which is the tension
between regional and multilateral initiative. If countries in the Americas want to foster worker rights
and improve labor standards, then why not just do that through the ILO?65 The answer is that
international labor cooperation can be pursued on a dual track — globally at the ILO and regionally

65

Robert M. Stern, ‘Labor Standards and Trade Agreements,’ University of Michigan Discussion
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in various fora. The periodic ILO regional conferences are aimed at capacity building and
strengthening of the multilateral system; they do not seek separate labor conventions.66
The orientation is different in the trade arena where regional efforts sometimes take the shape
of preferential trade agreements. These are discriminatory regimes that may or may not be
supportive of the multilateral World Trade Organization (WTO).67 In general, a regional trade
agreement can never rank higher than second best to a multilateral agreement.68 The nature of trade
and the need for cooperation is exactly the same in one region as in another.
By contrast, the rationale for a regional labor agreement can be stronger than for a regional
trade agreement if a regional labor market exists or if a region has a distinctive pattern of industrial
relations. In such instances, there may be a need for a discrete policy in one region that would not be
appropriate in another region, or globally. More likely, however, the justification for including labor
rules in a regional FTA will be to achieve a more balanced agreement. According to the World
Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, ‘...if regional integration is to be a stepping
stone towards a fairer globalization, a strong social dimension is required.’69
3. Normative Basis for International Labor Cooperation
Part 3 discusses the conceptual underpinning of a labor dimension to the FTAA. Because
labor law is so contested, this case will be constructed from the bottom up. First, I review the need
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for national labor law. Second, I explain the need for international labor law. Third, I consider
whether labor objectives should be sought in a trade versus a labor agreement.
A. Why National Labor Law?
National labor law is aimed at achieving three distinct objectives — correcting market failure,
protecting against government abuse, and enhancing equity. These concerns exist at the national
level, and would underlie labor law even in an imaginary world where countries shun transborder
economic intercourse.70 In the simplest vertical model, the government regulates the private actors.
In a vertical federal model, there are also allocations of authority between subnational governments
and the national government.
Perhaps the most compelling reason for labor law is to correct market failures.71 Such failures
include: (1) poor information about workplace hazards, (2) imperfect competition in labor markets,
(3) inadequate capital markets which make it hard for workers to obtain education, training, and to
relocate, (4) coercion of certain workers, such as children, and (5) an undersupply of quasi-public
goods, such as labor-management harmony. Another problem is high unemployment which might be
considered a labor market failure in that there is a seller of labor without a buyer. Yet high
unemployment also constitutes a government failure.72 The unemployment may be caused by poor
macroeconomic performance, excessive taxes or regulations on employment, or an economy
inhospitable to new investment.
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A second purpose of labor law is to protect individuals from mistreatment by government
officials. The most serious abuses are forced labor, infringement on freedom of association, and
discrimination against certain groups like indigenous persons and women. The prohibition of such
behavior is often coupled with laws recognizing individual rights to be free from such practices.
Governmental respect for those rights is a precondition for controlling similar abuses by private
actors.
A third reason for labor law is to achieve the national conception of justice chosen through
democratic processes. Labor markets are known to have inequalities in bargaining power between
workers and employers.73 This asymmetry is not necessarily a market failure — as markets are not
established to achieve equity — but it is a social problem for which governments use law to remedy.
For example, national labor law may provide a right to organize a labor union and to bargain
collectively. Governments might also mandate a minimum quality of working conditions as a way to
achieve income redistribution.
B. Why International Labor Law?
Why do governments cooperate, and perceive a need to cooperate on labor issues?74 The
question is an important one, and has not received the attention it deserves.75 Back in 1942, the InterAmerican Juridical Committee acknowledged that the realization of labor objectives ‘is primarily the
task of each separate State,’ but then postulated that ‘only by parallel international action can they be
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adequately secured.’76 The Committee, however, did not explain why such parallel action proves
useful. 77 This lecture seeks to do so.
In an autarkic economy, each nation would set its own labor law based solely on internal
considerations; yet in an interdependent world economy, foreign conditions will also shape national
welfare.78 Typically, the effects of foreign conditions are transmitted through the market via crossborder trade and investment. Yet there are also some external effects that are transmitted physically.79
For example, forced labor in Country A can send refugees in Country B; high unemployment in
Country B can send migrants to Country C. Country D might be concerned about trafficking in
women or children from Country E into D.
Before discussing the market-oriented factors and other rationales for international labor law,
I should note that all of these explanations are state-centric. In other words, they try to explain why a
government would seek coordination of labor law with another government, and would select
modalities between soft norms and hard rules. Because hard rules restrict national autonomy, there is
presumably a logic as to why a government would bind itself into such an arrangement. Yet
sometimes, a clear logic may not be evident.
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In reality, national policy may not be dictated by a rational sovereign. Instead, political
processes may be driven by volitions of elites and technocrats, and by pressures from interest groups.
Thus, putting forward conceptual reasons why unitary governments might cooperate in labor policy
may overemphasize top-down decisionmaking, and underemphasize the economic and social actors
that animate the political process.80 Explanations of why states cooperate to liberalize trade often get
stuck on the same flawed top-down orientation.
A central explanation for international labor cooperation is to prevent inefficient competition
for trade and investment. This explanation is now called ‘race to the bottom.’81 To wit, each
government would like to propound good labor standards, but cannot because of competition against
countries with lower labor standards. The optimal policy for each country of enjoying high standards
is replaced by mutual defection, with all countries lowering their standards. The same story can be
told in a less state-centric fashion by recounting the pressure that multinational corporations allegedly
place on governments to lower their standards in order to attract or maintain investment.82
The traditional solution to this problem is that governments should agree to harmonize their
core labor standards, or agree on minimum standards. This is mutually-supportive cooperation in the
sense that a high labor standard in one country can help its trading partner maintain its own high
standard. A bilateral agreement would make no sense if either of the two governments did not want
the high standard in the first place. Mutually-supportive cooperation can be distinguished from
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essential cooperation which occurs when solving a problem requires joint action (e.g., cleaning up
pollution in a border river).
The first champion of international labor law on mutually-supportive grounds was the SwissAlsatian social reformer Daniel Legrand. In 1840, Legrand began calling for action to respond to
labor ‘abuses arising under the influence of competition through negotiations between the
governments of industrial countries.’ 83 Legrand’s lobbying technique was to write a letter to a
conference of the German customs union, the Zollverein, and then get the Prussian government to
circulate the letter. No negotiations were undertaken by the Zollverein. Nevertheless, this episode
has historical importance in showing that the earliest effort to secure international labor cooperation
was linked to a trade agreement. Legrand worked nearly 20 years to promote international labor
legislation, and his bust graces the lobby of the Geneva building housing the WTO.
The view that trade competition can undermine national labor standards has maintained its
salience for over 160 years. In 1919, the preamble to Part XIII (Labour) of the Treaty of Versailles
famously intoned that ‘the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in
the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries.’84 As Herbert
Feis explained in 1927, the ILO was set up to help overcome the downward pressure on labor
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standards from international competition.85 Similar explanations for international labor standards
were offered in succeeding decades.86
The question of whether international competition presents a significant obstacle in reality
was being debated by the 1920s.87 Comprehensive empirical analysis did not begin until the mid1990s, when a study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
found no evidence that countries with low core labor standards enjoy better global export
performance than countries with high standards.88 Yet the fact that countries with high standards
perform well in trade and economic growth does not mean that governments act accordingly.
Governments may act irrationally. Or governments may be cowed by threats from multinational
firms to relocate unless the government lowers its labor standards. Jagdish Bhagwati has pointed out
that ‘the evidence suggests that multinationals, generally speaking, do not go streaking to where labor
rights are ignored or flouted.’89 Yet even so, a government may still worry about the possibility that
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such a loss of investment could happen. As Brian Langille has observed, the threat of divestment
may be much more important in labor relations than is evident in actual investment data.90
Fairness is another motivation for international labor standards. The fairness argument is
related to, yet separable from, the efficiency argument that international competition constrains the
proper setting of national labor standards. The fairness concern is that countries with high labor
standards should not have to compete against countries with low standards.91 This concern has been
voiced against free trade for over 150 years, and despite its incoherence— because unfairness is so
subjective92 — the fairness argument remains prominent today.
The reason why the claim of unfair trade stemming from sweated labor cannot be debunked is
that the quest for fairness is a leitmotif of contemporary trade policy. Because current WTO rules
seek to protect producers against injurious dumping and subsidies,93 no way exists in principle to rule
out parallel concerns about fairness to workers.94 Brian Langille said it well: ‘Fair trade is free
trade’s destiny.’95
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Another problem with the unfairness claim is that Country A may have a valid reason to have
a lower labor standard than Country B, and, furthermore, to use its labor standard as a way to
compete against B. Deciding when regulatory labor competition is appropriate is a difficult
challenge, particularly in a world in which worker exit (or more exactly, immigration) is sharply
constrained.96 An international harmonization of standards may not be better than continued
diversity.97
The alleged unfairness of trade on labor grounds has long been used as a reason to block
imports. In the 19th century, the concern was competition against ‘pauper labor’ or ‘cheap labor.’ In
the 1920s, the term ‘social dumping’ was applied to trade based on low labor conditions.98 After
World War II, when governments sought to establish a trading system, there were proposals to link
market access to the level of labor standards. As noted above, several Latin American countries
sought a labor escape clause, but this effort was resisted by the United States and others.99
A more refined version of the unfairness argument arose during the planning for the European
common market. In 1956, the ILO established a Group of Experts to examine the social aspects of
European integration. Among the Group’s recommendations was that if a subset of countries agreed
on the need to introduce some improvement in social or labor conditions, but, nevertheless, a
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minority of countries were to hold out against doing so, then a country whose interest was injured
might be authorized to take steps to protect itself against competition from the holdout countries.100
The Group further suggested that minimum labor standards be defined in an international agreement
with reference to ILO conventions in order ‘to eliminate international competition based on a
country’s failure to respect internationally agreed standards, and not to bring about a maximum of
uniformity between countries.’101 No action was taken on this recommendation.102
Although the concern about unfairness has been the principal rationale for a labor/trade link,
there is a converse tradition of seeking to use trade liberalization as a way to induce countries to raise
labor standards. The first champion was James T. Shotwell who, in 1933, proposed to U.S. Secretary
of State Cordell Hull that U.S. tariffs be lowered against countries that were taking action to raise
wages and standards of living.103 Hull rejected the idea. Fifty years later, the idea was revived and
made a feature of U.S. trade preference programs.104 The European Community also has incorporated
a labor provision in its tariff preferences for developing countries. The Community makes available
more favorable tariff treatment for countries deemed to be complying with the ILO’s core labor
standards.105
100

Social Aspects of European Economic Co-operation (ILO, 1956), Studies and Reports, New Series,
No. 46, paras. 218, 219. The Group of Experts was chaired by the Swedish economist and
parliamentary leader Bertil Ohlin. For a tribute to Ohlin, see Jagdish Bhagwati, Protectionism (MIT
Press, 1989), xi.
101

Social Aspects of European Economic Co-operation, supra note 100, para. 220.

102

Note that the Treaty of Rome of 1957 endorsed the harmonization of national social systems and
established a European Social Fund. André Sapir, ‘Who’s Afraid of Globalization? Domestic
Adjustment in Europe and America,’ in Roger B. Porter et al., (eds), Efficiency, Equity, and
Legitimacy (Brookings, 2001) 179, at 190 (discussing Arts. 117–125 of the Treaty).

103

James T. Shotwell, The Autobiography of James T. Shotwell (Bobbs-Merrill, 1961), at 308.

104

Steve Charnovitz, ‘Caribbean Basin Initiative: Setting Labor Standards,’ 107 Monthly Labor
Review, November 1984, 54.

105

Council Regulation (EC) No 2501/2001 of 10 December 2001 applying a scheme of generalised
tariff preferences, OJ 2001 L 346/1.

30

The labor provisions in contemporary FTAs are derivative of both traditions—the idea of
positive incentives and the concern about trade unfairness. Yet the unfairness concerns seem more
influential. After all, the cause of action in the U.S.–Chile FTA is lax national enforcement that
affects trade between the parties.106 Inadequate labor law enforcement that lacks an impact on trade
would not be actionable.
Another justification for international labor cooperation emphasizes the role of human
resources in economic development.107 Recall the attention to ‘human capital’ at the Pan American
Conference of 1933. Promoting fuller employment and better working conditions in each country is
in the interest of all because national prosperity has positive spillovers. Once best practices toward
human resource development and workplace regulation are determined, then governments will
benefit from widespread adoption of such practices.108
Note that this rationale may explain why governments cooperate, but does not fully explain
why governments would bind themselves in international conventions. One explanation offered by
political economists is that a breakdown in the domestic political process may prevent governments
from enacting legislation to correct a market failure.109 An international requirement to do so is
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therefore politically useful for a government to seek and accept. The Japanese term ‘gaiatsu’ is
sometimes employed to describe this strategic use of foreign pressure for domestic reform. The same
idea of an external normative push appeared in the 1956 report by the ILO Group of Experts, which
explained that ‘If international agreement can be reached that the introduction of certain types of
social measures is desirable, this will strengthen the hands of those who, in the various countries, are
pressing for the introduction of the measures in question.’110
The last rationale to be discussed is not based on a utilitarian purpose, but rather on the
deontological ground that workers are to be respected as individuals.111 In modern parlance, we
capsulize this by saying that labor rights are human rights.112 Yet one should also remember that
labor rights were conceived as a form of international solidarity well before the modern human rights
movement.
International law is premised on the dignity of the worker. As Paul O’Higgins has pointed
out, the idea that ‘Labour is not a commodity’ is a fundamental precept of international labor law
originated by the Irish economist, John Kells Ingram, in 1880.113 The constitutional act of 1919
creating the ILO declared that ‘...labour should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of
commerce,’ and the ILO Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944 refined this proposition to state: ‘labour
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is not a commodity.’114 Besides the influence of Graham, that idea has a historical basis in religious
doctrine, particularly Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical of 1891, Rerum Novarum. This encyclical declares
that ‘It is neither just nor human so to grind men down with excessive labor as to stupefy their minds
and wear out their bodies.’115
So far in Part 3, this lecture has sought to explain why governments intervene in the labor
market, and why international harmonization is pursued. The next section in Part 3 discusses the
choice of law. That is, should labor harmonization be pursued in labor agreements or in trade
agreements?
C. Labor Versus Trade Agreements
Using a labor treaty to achieve common national objectives on labor would seem to be a more
straightforward path than using a trade treaty. Certainly, that was the idea in 1919 when the ILO was
created, many decades before a comparable international organization was established to promote
common trade objectives. Nevertheless, the assumption underlying the longtime efforts to add a
social clauses to trade agreements is that the ILO is inadequate to achieving its purpose. Advocates of
using the WTO to reinforce the ILO often contend that ‘...the ILO does not possess the international
legal authority to enforce labour standards against recalcitrant states.’116
In the Inter-American context, no thought has been given to the idea of adopting regional
labor treaties. The global-regional dynamic in labor policy is different than in trade policy, where it
is thought that bilateral and regional agreements can play a useful role in supplementing multilateral
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agreements. Yet no one is arguing that the alleged inadequacies of the ILO should be remedied by a
stronger regional labor agreement.117
Explaining why is a puzzle. The answer that governments are uninterested in regional labor
policy is unsatisfying because, if so, then why would they seek to insert labor provisions in a regional
trade agreement? It could be that governments lack frameworks for negotiating labor agreements in
the same way that they negotiate trade agreements.118 Or it could be that most governments do not
want new international labor disciplines, and can only be induced to accept them through linkage to
highly-desired trade agreements.
A theory of trade linkage has been developed by David Leebron who distinguishes between
two claims — strategic versus substantive linkage.119 In strategic linkage, the inclusion of labor in a
trade agreement is dictated by political demands from particular countries. In substantive linkage,
labor is included in a trade agreement either: (1) because labor and trade norms are related, or (2)
because, without a linkage, the trade agreement might undermine labor norms. Leebron calls the first
reason ‘coherence’ and the second ‘consequentialist.’
So far, no analyst has taken Leebron’s framework and applied it to a trade/labor linkage. All
of the international concerns discussed above — a race to the bottom, fairness, and worker dignity —
would seem to reflect either coherence or consequential aims. Are labor rights consistent with
trading rights?120 Would a trade agreement be more successful if accompanied by a baseline of core
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labor standards? These questions are important and deserve careful answers beyond the scope of
these lectures.
However persuasive the rationale for including labor in a trade agreement, governments
should also weigh the disadvantages of doing so.121 One possible problem is that seeking labor
provisions may discombobulate trade negotiations. Another is that the labor disciplines may lead to
trade disputes that will undo trade liberalization. To be sure, these objections also apply to other
topics of trade linkage, such as intellectual property rights.
Quite apart from any harm of labor linkage to the trade regime is the potential harm to the
labor regime. Those who view the ILO and regional labor cooperation as ineffectual would probably
not be concerned about such harm. Yet more thoughtful analysts have recognized the substantial
benefits of the ILO, including how it helps governments through norm generation and capacity
building.122 Viewed in this way, the lack of FTA-style enforcement is a virtue of the labor regime
rather than a weakness.
Most analysts who advocate the inclusion of labor disciplines in trade agreements prefer
either the current United States approach with FTAs, or a more muscular approach that would
incorporate ILO standards. In my view, neither path is optimal. In the current FTA approach,
governments have crafted a labor discipline that is sufficiently vapid that it won’t have any effect on
trade flows. Yet if FTAs were to require compliance with core ILO conventions, that would affect
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trade flows, and potentially make it harder for developing countries to expand their exports.123
Furthermore, both paths are inadequate because they miss opportunities to zero in on a few important
trade and labor connections. Part 4 will present my own recommendations for how to incorporate a
labor dimension into the FTAA.
4. Recommendations for the FTAA
A quarter century ago, the ILO annual conference passed a resolution requesting governments
to:
see that the trade agreements concluded within the framework of appropriate
institutions promote both the expansion of world trade and the local utilisation of
the labour force available in various countries and make it possible to achieve a
real improvement of the standard of living of the populations in accordance with
the objectives of international labour standards in so far as they have been
ratified.124
The resolution is noteworthy because it is a rare instance of an ILO pronouncement on trade
agreements. The ILO’s advice was well-crafted. The expansion of world trade can be good for
workers,125 but the actual outcome depends on the design of the trade agreement. Various features in
a trade agreement can affect the amount of job creation, workplace conditions, and prospects for a
rising standard of living.
If the FTAA is to have a labor dimension, its member governments should be bolder and more
innovative than in existing Inter-American free trade agreements. Provisions are needed to do the
following: (A) Enhance the consumer role in the labor market, (B) Promote worker adjustment, (C)
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Disallow prohibitions of unions in export processing zones, and (D) Expand protection for migrant
workers. Part 4 presents these recommendations and then concludes the lecture.
A. Enhance the Consumer Role
Although government regulation and subsidies can play an important part in correcting labor
market failures, they are not the only tools available. Governments can also facilitate efforts by
consumers to seek more socially responsive practices by businesses. The consumer is empowered
when he has reliable information about the employment conditions of the workers who produce the
products that he buys. Such information can be facilitated by social labels, industry partnerships, and
voluntary codes of conduct that are carefully monitored.126 The worker is helped when her employer
follows best practices in labor relations and seeks to invest in its employees.
How should a trade agreement catalyze such changes? Not through heavy-handed rules, but
rather by improving regulatory transparency, encouraging national stakeholder dialogues, and using
consultative mechanisms at the international level. As noted in Table 1, the Association Agreement
between the EC and Chile provides one example in its provisions on social dialogue.127 The FTAA
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could adopt that approach, and could also establish a network of the ongoing labor promotional
activities in the NAALC, Mercosur, and other agreements of regional integration.
B. Promote Worker Adjustment
International trade will make a country better off as a whole, and yet some individuals may be
left worse off. Therefore, governments should seek to broaden the distribution of the benefits from
trade and deliver adjustment assistance to workers who suffer extended dislocations. That
government role is sometimes called a ‘safety net,’128 but that term seems too reactive. The aim of an
adjustment program should not only be to protect workers from catastrophic impacts, but also to
proactively help them find decent work in a changing economy. The instruments available include
retraining, relocation allowances, and other employability assistance.
As noted in Part 1, the need for governmental efforts to accord ‘economic security’ in the
Americas was perceived over 50 years ago, and the ILO regional conference of 1946 called for
‘training and retraining of adult workers.’ Yet despite these resolutions, very little has been done on
a regional basis to promote worker adjustment. In 2002, the 7th FTAA Ministerial conference of
2002 (Quito Declaration) suggested the idea of a Hemispheric Cooperation Program that would,
among other tasks, strengthen the capacity of countries in ‘adjusting to integration.’129 But to my
knowledge, nothing concrete has been done to implement such a program or to improve the delivery
of worker adjustment assistance.
Given that the benefits of a good national worker adjustment program would accrue primarily
to that nation’s own economy, governments should not need any fillip to carry out such programs.
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Sadly, though, many governments tend to be lackadaisical about responding to economic
dislocations.130 Even the U.S. government, the biggest spender in the Americas, underinvests in such
programs.
One idea for increasing governmental attention to worker adjustment would be to
internationalize the issue. As Philip Alston has noted, ILO Director-General C. Wilfred Jenks gave
an address to the UN Economic and Social Council in 1971 in which he posited an ILO role in the ‘...
adoption of effective manpower adjustment measures calculated to facilitate trade liberalization
measures by eliminating or reducing some of the grounds for opposition to them.’131 Jenks was right
to perceive labor adjustment as an international challenge, and to see the connection to gaining public
support for trade. In 1976, the ILO World Employment Conference advocated ‘active manpower
policies and adjustment assistance’ and stated that ‘Adjustment assistance is considered preferable to
import restrictions.’132
Other stakeholders who recognized worker adjustment as an international problem suggested
that it be taken up by the trading system. For example, in the early 1970s, the International
Metalworkers’ Federation proposed adding a ‘social clause’ to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade that would combine developing country job creation through new exports with industrial
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country efforts to give affected workers employment and income guarantees.133 To my knowledge,
the first proposal to include adjustment in a free trade agreement came in 1993, when Robert Howse
suggested providing a ‘right’ to worker adjustment in the NAFTA.134 Howse’s proposal did not
specify a package of benefits, but rather sought a commitment of the trading partners to deliver
adjustment and to coordinate their efforts. His proposal was not adopted either in the NAFTA or in
the labor side agreement.
Howse’s idea continues to have merit, however, and governments should include a basic
commitment to worker adjustment within the FTAA. The richer governments in the region should
provide financial assistance to adjustment programs in other countries, and all the governments
should cooperate to develop quality standards for training programs. By making a commitment to
worker adjustment, each country could, over time, lessen public opposition to trade agreements, and
reduce the social and economic losses stemming from prolonged unemployment.
In 2003, the WTO Secretariat issued a study on ‘Adjusting to Trade Liberalization’ that
devotes a chapter to how ‘Governments can facilitate the adjustment process.’ This chapter discusses
social safety nets, labor markets, education and training, and other issues.135 Although this WTO
effort to delve into labor issues is commendable, the study was a disappointment because it ignored
the opportunity for international cooperation. Indeed, the attention given to the international level is
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perverse, with the Secretariat instructing governments on how to delay trade liberalization by using
lengthy transition periods and imposing temporary import protection.136
C. Disallow Bans on Unions in Export Zones
No one can seriously deny that the issue of worker rights in export processing zones (EPZs) is
related to trade, and can be properly addressed within a trade agreement. Nevertheless, no FTA
contains standards for how workers are treated in such zones. Yet EPZs in many countries engage in
severe abuses of fundamental worker rights.137
Crafting an FTAA rule for EPZs would be a challenge. The ILO lacks any conventions or
recommendations on this topic. Surely it is too simplistic to say that EPZs should follow the same
labor law that otherwise exists in a country, as that law could be too low to guarantee internationallyrecognized labor rights. On the other hand, prevailing law could be so restrictive that it inhibits
investment. For a long time, many countries in Latin America suffered an enervating combination of
excessive import protection combined with excessive de jure labor protection, with a consequent loss
of investment and employment opportunities.138
My recommendation is that FTAA governments start with one basic rule—that EPZs must not
forbid trade unions—and incorporate that into the FTAA. That rule would require some elaboration,
of course, but governments should not try to import everything from the authoritative ILO
conventions on freedom of association and collective bargaining. Any complaint raised would need
to be premised on the FTAA rule, even against governments that are party to core ILO conventions.
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The complaint procedure I envision is victim-to-state, not state-to-state. The rationale for a
victim-to-state mechanism is that it depoliticizes the dispute system so that no government is saddled
with having to espouse the claims of its citizens. Perhaps one reason why no NAFTA labor case was
ever filed is that the target government might consider that an unfriendly act.
The complaint process would be similar to the investor-state arbitration in NAFTA except that
an individual would also be able to lodge a complaint about the actions of its own government, rather
than only a foreign government. Criteria would be needed to establish eligibility to lodge a
complaint, and I favor a flexible procedure that permits complaints from individual victims, unions,
and public interest groups. A valid complaint about an EPZ would lead to the appointment of an
independent panel similar to the panels available for FTA commercial disputes. The worker would
not have a right of action against the employer. Cases of that sort would need to remain in national
tribunals. Even so, a screening mechanism should be set up to protect a company’s reputation from
being injured by frivolous complaints.
If the panel rules against the defendant government, the government would be given time to
correct the violation, but if no correction ensues, the scofflaw government should be required to pay a
fine until the matter is corrected. The fine would be paid to the independent FTAA commission,
which could use the money for its regular programs.
Because the EPZ mechanism suggested here differs so much from the labor mechanism
provided for in the CAFTA, it may be useful to summarize those differences. My proposal is based
on an international rule (to be formulated in the FTAA), while CAFTA is based on each country’s
own domestic law.139 My proposal provides for a private right of action, while CAFTA is state-tostate.140 My proposal allows an individual to secure an independent panel, while in CAFTA, an
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individual submits a communication to an office in its country.141 My proposal provides for a
financial sanction in the event of non-compliance, while in CAFTA, the scofflaw government pays a
monetary assessment to the CAFTA commission, with that money being used for labor initiatives in
the defendant country.142 My proposal is probably too bold to get enacted, but it would be an
interesting experiment that could fructify a right to form and join a free trade union in EPZs.
D. Expand Protection for Migrant Workers
Although FTAs seek to liberalize the movement of goods, services, and capital, they have
tended to given little attention to the movement of people. Yet worker mobility is logically a part of
economic integration, and, like importing and exporting, can benefit both the sending and receiving
countries.143 This principle is recognized with regard to temporary entry for business executives and
professionals, and the same need also exists for less-skilled workers.
The issue of labor mobility has been addressed in some Inter-American trade agreements.
Most notably, the Caribbean Community provides for the free movement of university graduates and
those in listed occupations.144 The NAFTA contains a chapter on Temporary Entry for Business
Persons, as do the U.S. and Canada FTAs with Chile.145 But the CAFTA does not because, in 2003,
the U.S. government got queasy from making immigration commitments in trade agreements.146 For
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the United States, it seems that very little has changed since 1928 when it told the Pan American
conference that the control of immigration ‘is a matter of purely domestic concern....’147 The ongoing
FTAA talks have neglected even to set up a negotiating group for temporary entry.
If freer immigration cannot be achieved within the FTAA, then governments might instead try
to negotiate provisions for greater protection of migrant workers. Relevant international norms
already exist,148 and key guarantees could be incorporated into the FTAA in the same manner that
guarantees from intellectual property treaties will probably be incorporated. Establishing rules for
the benefit of migrant workers in the FTAA would help individuals who are commonly exploited.
Such rules would have synergies with ongoing regional cooperation on migration policy.149
E. Summary and Overall Conclusion
The ideas in Part 4 seek to stimulate practical, concerted action to address labor and
employment problems of regional economic integration. My recommendations for the FTAA do not
include an obligation to adhere to core ILO conventions. However one weighs the advantages and
disadvantages of that course, such fusion is unlikely to be accepted by FTAA governments. As for
the reciprocal obligation to enforce national law, it should be omitted unless governments are willing
to replace the current window dressing with a private right of action.
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Contemporary FTAs seem designed to assist global corporations and devote little attention to
those without power or wealth. If governments were to get serious about helping vulnerable workers,
then such action could help to humanize trade agreements and lead to more widely shared prosperity.

